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Abstract 
Following the monetary integration trends in Europe, there had been the desire for the 
African Monetary Union and the creation of a unified currency for the African continent. 
This proposed African common currency would be known as ‘afro’, a single currency for 
Africa by 2028.  The continent of Africa, characterised by the largest number of countries 
and the largest number of currencies has consequently embarked on a special project for 
an African monetary integration.  The 1991 Abuja treaty set out six stages in the process 
of achieving a monetary union and a single currency for Africa. This strategy for African 
monetary integration is based on progressive economic and monetary integration of 
African economic communities which are regarded as building blocks of Africa. These 
economic communities are the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of the West African 
States (ECOWAS). Evidences generated from the analyses of the formation of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) prompted many conclusions that there were major 
defects in its establishment as exposed by the Eurozone crisis. Some of these identified 
optimum currency area (OCA) related design flaws of the Eurozone are: (i) the absence 
of effective economic governance mechanism; (ii) the retention of banking supervision 
and resolution at national levels; (iii) the lack of financial back-stops and crisis resolution 
mechanisms at the union level; and (iv) defects in the design of the Eurozone's common 
central bank. Clearly, the Eurozone crisis has obviously revealed that banking union and 
integrated financial market, fiscal union and integrated fiscal framework and political 
union are all required in a monetary union, for completeness and sustainability. 
Unfortunately, these are issues not addressed by the OCA theory. From view-points in 
various debates on the sustainability and completeness of the EMU as well as various 
revealed faults in the design of Eurozone and the defects inherent in the original optimum 
currency area (OCA) theory and its application to monetary integration, this paper 
consequently discusses and highlights banking union, fiscal union and political union as 
pathways to complete and sustainable monetary integration in Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
The continent of Africa characterised by the largest number of countries and the largest 
number of currencies currently has embarked on a special project for an African 
monetary integration.1  Following the monetary integration trends in Europe, there had 
been the desire for the African Monetary Union which aims at the creation of a unified 
currency for the African continent. This proposed African common currency is to be known as ‘afro’.  Economists and other analysts consider the step towards a stronger and 
great African regional integration which were to be in the interest of Africa because of the 
small size (in terms of economy and population) of many African countries.  
Over decades ago, many regional economic groups were evolved in Africa for the purpose 
of free trade. Some of these regional economic groups still exist till date while some are 
modifications and rejuvenations of those that were in existence during the colonial 
regimes in Africa.2 Nevertheless, there are plans in pipeline for several currency unions 
within the regions of Africa as at present. This plan, set out in the 1991 Abuja Treaty, makes an African single currency the African Union’s long term goal. Article 44 of the 
1991 Abuja Treaty states that “.......member states shall within a timetable to be 
determined by the Assembly (of the Organisation of African Unity), harmonise their 
monetary, financial and payments policies and boost intra-community trade in goods and 
services to further the objectives of the community and to enhance monetary cooperation 
among member states.”3 The 1991 Abuja treaty set out six stages in the process of 
achieving a monetary union and a single currency for Africa by 2028.4 This strategy for 
African monetary integration is based on progressive economic and monetary 
integration of African economic communities which are regarded as building blocks of 
Africa. These economic communities are the East African Community (EAC), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of the West 
African States (ECOWAS). 
There were major defects in the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
as exposed by the Eurozone crisis. Some of these identified optimum currency area (OCA) 
                                                          
1 This is in respect of the currency unions sharing the two separate CFA francs in Central Africa and West Africa 
respectively 
2 Presently, South Africa’s Monetary Area and the CFA franc Zones in Central and West Africa respectively are the 
monetary integration arrangements that still exist. 
3 Regional Integration- http://www.uneca.org/aria3/chap1.pdf 
4 The 1991 Abuja Treaty which was signed on 3 June 1991 and was effective in May 1994 established the African 
Economic Community. 
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related design flaws of the Eurozone are: (i) the absence of effective economic 
governance mechanism; (ii) the retention of banking supervision and resolution at 
national levels; (iii) the lack of financial back-stops and crisis resolution mechanisms at 
the union level; and (iv) defects in the design of the Eurozone's common central bank. 
Clearly, the Eurozone crisis has obviously revealed that banking union and integrated 
financial market, fiscal union and integrated fiscal framework and political union are all 
pivotal in a monetary union, for completeness and sustainability. Unfortunately, these are 
issues not addressed by the OCA theory. 
From view-points in various debates on the sustainability of the EMU and various 
revealed faults in the design of Eurozone and well as the defects inherent in the original 
optimum currency area (OCA) theory and its application to monetary integration, this 
paper consequently discusses and highlights banking union, fiscal union and political 
union as pathways to complete and sustainable monetary integration in Africa. 
 
2. Making the Case for Banking Union and Integrated Financial Market  
The traditional OCA theory makes no provision for any theoretical basis for a banking 
union embedded in a monetary union. One of the probable reasons attributed to this was 
the prevalence of capital restrictions in the 1960s when the OCA theory was evolved.5 
Maes (2002) was of the view that the OCA theory was brought to the fore by those 
economists who were not well focused on theoretical bases of finance.6 However, such 
banking union should be expected to encompass single financial rules and regulations, a 
single banking supervision, a well-funded single resolution mechanism for 'bad' banks 
and harmonised deposit insurance. These are essential whenever banks are involved in 
cross-border capital flows, given the destabilising effects of the inadequate supervision 
and regulation of a cross-border lending policies. In the event of insolvency of banks and 
the absence of orderly resolution mechanism, bail-out was seen as the only alternative. 
This promoted moral hazards, caused bank under-capitalisation problem, negatively 
affected the solvency of national governments that were responsible for bank 
capitalisation, and increased the spirits of robotic banks and companies. If not well 
                                                          
5Though, the 1973/74 oil shock and the 1978/81 upsurge in bank lending and the Eurodollar market all contributed 
to sudden increase in international flows of capital; and lessons could not be learnt about the reversals of these 
international capital flows leading to various debt crises.  
6Ivo Maes in ‘Economic thought and the making of EMU, Selected Essays, 2002. 
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addressed, this problems could lead to decline confidence in banking systems, spilling 
beyond the specific countries. 
According to the OCA theory, the survival of a monetary union is the based only on the 
condition that benefits of the adoption of a single currency outstrip its cost for the loss of monetary independence and exchange rate instrument. If a monetary union’s member state’s economy encounters an asymmetric shock and this condition was not met, factor 
flexibility (labour mobility and price flexibility) would offer the desired solution. 
Otherwise, if cross border mobility is low, free cross border is weak, labour market is 
immobile and wages displays rigidity, the rationale for a banking union would be 
apparent. De Grauwe (2011) established that the reversal of capital flow could spark off 
asymmetric shocks in a monetary union (as exhibited by the EMU) simply because of the 
loss of control over national currency and monetary independence by the country that 
opted to be a member of such monetary union who, in comparison with countries outside 
the union, are vulnerable to reversals in capital flows as well as speculations against its 
sovereign debts.7 
Further development made to the properties of the new OCA by Mundell (1973) reflects 
that pooling of reserve and diversification of portfolio could moderate adverse shock 
better in a currency area arguing further that if countries within a currency area can 
insure each through financial markets, they could still share a single currency in the 
absence of labour mobility, wage flexibility and solidarity mechanism. Courtesy of capital 
flows, asymmetric shocks are lessened by financial integration.8 This would be made 
possible since member countries in deficit can borrow from member countries in surplus 
or rather, sell foreign assets if the need for current account for deficit financing arises. 
Financial integration and common currency are therefore the two sides of same coin in 
many ways (Draghi, 2014). Under the umbrella of a single currency, an ‘adverse shock’ 
country can easily share the loss with a trading partner in the monetary union due to the fact that the two countries can lay claims on each other’s output while ‘insuring’ each 
other through private financial market as buttressed by Geeroms and Karbownik (2014). 
                                                          
7 Owing to the retention of monetary policy control, it is very possible for the country outside the monetary union to, 
through its monetary authority, allow the erosion of its domestic debt by higher inflation or still, monetise its 
sovereign debt (Geeroms and Karbownil, 2014). 
8 It was at the point of conceiving the idea of euro that integrated financial market was seen as essential if a common 
currency would be effective – Delors Report, 1989 
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These are further justifications for an integrated financial market and a banking union in 
a monetary union.  
The impossible trinity of Schoenmaker (2013) pressed home the justification and reasons 
for a banking union in a monetary union. The ‘Impossibile Trinity’ centres on how 
simultaneous banking union, national supervision and financial stability are. Two logical ways of overcoming the ‘Impossible Trinity’ are proffered as: embracing segmented 
national banking markets and forgoing benefits of financial integration; (ii) moving 
towards supra-national structure for financial supervision and crisis resolution.9 Box A 
below shows the stabilising and destabilising effects of financial integration for a 
monetary union. 
Box A: Stabilising and Destabilising Effects of integrated Financial Markets in a Monetary Union10 
Stabilising Effects: Enhanced Portfolio Diversification: Greater cross-border diversification of banks 
and other investors within a currency area could reduce shocks at the domestic level as well as leads to 
higher income an d enhanced consumption risk sharing (with evidence of reduced consumption 
growth volatility 
Improved Allocative Efficiency: This is about ensuring the channelling of productive capital towards 
most efficient firms, thus improving overall economic performance as evident in Europe, due to the 
presence of large cross-border banks.  
Destabilising Effects 
Risk Taking: This could be caused by the problems of asymmetric information which could emanate 
from cross-border lending, leading to misaligned incentives. 
Contagion in Interbank Market: This is possible when and if there are negative shocks as there could be 
the compression of risks premia by imbalances in savings abroad, thus causing leverage increases in 
the domestic financial sector. These may also have effect on cross-border lending to the real sector 
The welfare benefits of the stabilising effects (greater diversification and improved allocative 
efficiency) would offset the welfare costs of destabilising effects (risk taking and contagion). 
 
The African financial system that is heavily bank-based and in which banks play vital role 
in cross-border capital flow would require a banking union. If banking supervision and 
regulation in a monetary union’s member country neglects the crucial implications of the 
lending policies of the domestic bank across the border, this can bring destabilising 
implications for other members of the union. Bail-outs would be seen as the only 
alternative in the event of insolvency of banks if there is a lack of orderly resolution 
mechanism. This, however (a) encourages moral hazard; (b) makes problem banks to be 
under-capitalised; (c) portends threats to the solvency of the sovereigns responsible for 
capitalisation; (d) increases the emergence of ‘zombie’ banks and firms (Eichengreen, 
2014). All together, these erode and damage the confidence in banking; and this damage 
may go beyond the initiating country and spread over the entire currency area. The 
                                                          
9Explanations of Schoemaker’s ‘Impossible Trinity’ offered by Geeroms and Karbownik 
10Draghi (2014) 
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traditional OCA theory neglected and failed to recognise these due to the tight regulation 
of banks and strict limitation of cross-border finance (lending and borrowing) in the 
1960s.  
The 2007/2008 financial crisis in the Eurozone revealed the salient elements of banking 
union which are essential for the sustainability of a monetary union as: (i) a common 
supervisory mechanism; (ii) an adequately funded common resolution mechanism for 
bad banks; (iii) harmonised deposit insurance scheme. 
Common Supervisory Mechanism: For an African monetary union, this would guarantee impartial and strict supervisory oversight which contributes to the ‘destruction of the 
link between sovereigns and banks as well as reduce the probability of future systemic 
banking crisis within the monetary union. The common central bank would be armed 
with strong and adequate supervisory and control powers in this regard. Given the 
independence, incentives and its instruments, this mechanism would support 
supervisors better in the identification of risks and in acting counter cyclically. The 
features of a common supervisory mechanism in this respect should be: (a) legal 
independence; (b) independence of a single government or national financial system; (c) 
micro-prudential powers; (d) macro-prudential powers to resolve financial imbalances; 
(e) accountability for bank failures within the covered jurisdiction. Further, the mechanism comes with policy framework that is ‘more conducive’ for cross-border 
banking integration which would lead to the maximisation of the benefits of financial 
integration. 
When the lines-of-divide between these jurisdictions (which bring up compliance costs) 
are destroyed, the distinction between cross-border ‘home and host supervisors’ would consequently be destroyed. This is in addition to the removal of ‘hidden barriers’ to cross border activity’ linked to national presence. The highlights of the merits of common 
supervision in a banking union embedded in a monetary union are expressed in Box B 
below. 
In spite of the listed benefits, a common supervision within an African monetary union (which would cause the union’s banking systems to be strong and not prone to crisis) 
should not only focus on banking system failure or bank distress prevention, even if such 
supervision is at the high standard level. 
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Box B: Benefits of Banking Union through Common Supervision: 
As benefits for the African monetary integration, common supervision in a banking union 
will: 
 ensure the identification of emerging excessive risk-taking and the associated 
cross-border externalities; 
 increase transparency of national banking system. (More transparency, less 
uncertainty manifestation through the  possibility of hidden risks); 
 give accountability avenue for failure of banks; 
 provide macro-prudential powers and instruments to counter financial 
imbalances and prevent financial instability; 
 reduce the possibility of domestic banking system being swept in fiscal problems 
encountered by national governments. The reason is that, unlike the national 
supervisors, a supra-national supervisor would find it easier to intervene in 
situations where banks are made to join in providing cheap funds to household, 
firms and governments; 
 result in  convergence of rules standards and harmonised culture. This, for 
instance, would solve the problems caused by allocation of similar weight to risks 
in same category while recognising the influence of difference in markets and 
domestic economic situations; and furthermore, it would impose some principles, methods and parameters for the improvement of banks’ internal models, 
harmonises the treatment of non-performing loans and provisions for 
bad/doubtful debts; 
 reduce substantially, compliance costs, given the effect of consolidated nature of 
reports and savings in interactions with several, different authorities and the 
observance of different rules;  
 minimise hidden barriers to cross-border activity linked to national preference; 
 ensure uniform high standards and competitive conditions across the monetary 
union; 
 facilitate measure necessary in dealing with cross-border systemic effects 
towards preventing the occurrence of financial crisis. 
If the common supervisor is to discharge its duty effectively, there should be an orderly 
resolution of banks in distress. This leads to second pertinent element of a banking union 
in a monetary union. 
Common Resolution Mechanism: In a monetary union, if supervision is effectively shifted 
to a common supervisory mechanism, it is in effect, necessary for the responsibility for 
the resolution of banks to be shifted to the union level. A common resolution mechanism 
in an African monetary union would create a single authority that would be charged with 
the task of bank resolution within the monetary union.11More appropriately, this 
mechanism should come up with a single resolution fund that should be provided by all 
banks in the monetary union and made available to these banks in distress.  
The common resolution mechanism should ensure the orderly winding down of banking institutions that are not viable so as to protect taxpayers’ funds. This primary aim only 
                                                          
11Bank resolution is the process in which a distressing bank is handled in order to avoid possible knock-on effects on other 
financial intermediaries, thus preventing systemic problems in the financial markets within the monetary union. 
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points at the giving assurance of financial stability and neither absorption of losses nor 
provision of capital to a banking institution under the resolution. 
Box C: Desirability of Banking Union through Common Bank Resolution 
A single resolution mechanism in the banking union embedded in an African monetary 
union would be desirable because of: 
 swift and impartial decision making that mitigates obstacles (national bias and 
frictions in cross-border cooperation to resolution and reduced cost of resolution 
(as economic values of banks to be resolved are maintained); 
 reduction (as low as possible) in the resolution costs; and the breaking of the bank-
sovereign nexus. If a resolution body backed by efficient resolution tool is strong 
and independent, it would possess the necessary independence and capabilities 
(administrative, financial and legal) to implement low-cost and effective resolution. 
Increased market discipline and minimised cost (residual) for taxpayers would be 
experienced in cases of bank distresses; 
 as a complement to the common supervisory mechanism, it ascertains the 
restructuring and closing down of failing banks. As the common supervisory 
mechanism would make prompt and unbiased assessments of bank resolution 
needs, the common resolution scheme provides for the actual effective and timely 
resolution.  
Funds meant for this purpose would not be considered for the bail-out of failing banks. 
Resolution decisions under the mechanism are expected to address cross-border 
resolution issues in unbiased and effective manner. Logically, the common resolution 
mechanism would be complementary to the common supervisory mechanism. While 
assessing financial fragmentation within the union, the common resolution mechanism 
would break possible bank-sovereign link.  
For the African monetary cooperation initiative, the desirability of a banking union 
derived from a single banking resolution mechanism is expressed in Box C above. 
Common Deposit Insurance Scheme: The purpose of the common deposit insurance 
scheme for the African monetary integration schemes would be to serve as an essential 
assurance providing sufficient insurance of eligible deposits of all banking institutions in 
the integrated countries. This is necessary because even if the financial integration is of 
high quality, shocks that could not be contained within the private sector could still 
occur.12Therefore, this common insurance scheme would assist in the insulation of 
sovereign through the improvement of private risk-sharing within the monetary union. 
Though, at the Eurozone level, the idea of a harmonised deposit insurance had been 
contentious element of banking union, owing to its debt mutualisation implications, it 
was opined that such scheme is necessary for a banking union to succeed and 
consequently for a monetary union to be sustainable. A common deposit insurance 
                                                          
12The well integrated financial system of the US still has the Federal Deposit Insurance Scheme playing a vital role in 
crisis management. 
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scheme would mitigate risks inherent in capital flight because depositors would always 
perceive the common currency as safe in a strong member of the monetary union than in 
the distressed member state that encounters economic hardship. In consideration of 
these discussions on the essence of embedding banking union in a monetary union, it 
appropriate to support the view of Eichengreen (2014)that  monetary union without 
banking union will not work. 
 
3. Making the Case for Fiscal Union and Integrated Budgetary Framework  
The main intention of fiscal union embedded in a monetary union is to ensure greater 
discipline in public finance and to provide a range of fiscal policy instrument at the union 
level. This would evolve a central union budget and common issuance of public debts. The 
main aim is the establishment of a central budget specifically meant for macroeconomic 
stabilisation of the entire monetary union. In a monetary union, the strength of national 
fiscal deficits are limited in helping to confront deep recession, hence the need for a 
union-wide support.  
Generally, a central budget (fiscal union) has crucial roles to play in the absorption of 
country specific economic shocks within a financially integrated monetary union. It is 
believed that a union-wide, centralised budget should: (a) offer a significant transfer of 
resources (though may be temporary) whenever large regional shock would occur; (b) 
serve as severe recession counteracting instrument for the entire monetary union; and 
(c) promote financial stability within the monetary union (Wolff, 2012). In a monetary 
union, the fiscal policy, the mobility of labour of labour and capital, and the flexibility of 
price and costs all share the burden of adjustments to country specific economic shocks. 
If the mobility of labour and capital and the flexibility of price and cost are at the low ebb, 
it would therefore the necessary that fiscal risks are shared in such situation in which 
economic adjustment mechanisms to country specific shocks are less perfect (Van 
Rompuy, 2012). An integrated budgetary framework (fiscal union) would, for an African 
monetary union encompass: (i) mechanism for fiscal discipline and fiscal policy 
coordination; (ii) fiscal capacity as instruments that would, through centralised insurance 
system,  help in dealing with country-specific shocks; (iii)establishment of forms of jointly 
and severally guaranteed debt mutualisation. 
The OCA theory postulates that membership of a monetary union can be too costly 
because of: (i) the possibility and existence of incessant and strong asymmetric 
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macroeconomic shock hitting member countries differently; and (ii) lack of capable 
instrument for adjustment in efforts to absorb these shocks alternatively. This is where 
the lack of risk sharing elements between members of a monetary union is apparent.13 In 
this regard, a common risk sharing tool and the provision of fiscal cushion would ease 
country-specific shocks and prevent of contagion across the monetary union, hence the 
essence of a fiscal integration in a monetary union.  Box D below contains highlights of 
some reasons for the justification for the entrenching of fiscal union in monetary 
integrated African economies.   
Box D: Justification for Fiscal Union in an African Monetary Union 
A fiscal union embedded in an African monetary union will: 
 smoothen shocks affecting only a constituent part of the African monetary union. 
It would provide a common fiscal cushion to meet idiosyncratic economic and 
financial shocks. This strengthens confidence in the entire monetary union, 
remove or prevent spill over of problem that may be erupted by crisis and thus 
reduces the cost of shock for all members of the monetary union; 
 build effective risk-sharing arrangement for sovereign debts, while avoiding 
moral hazard problems and significant inter country fiscal transfer; 
 finance large common investment projects with public debts that are jointly 
issued, as much as possible;  
 enhance fiscal capacities through restriction of laxity in public spending by 
possible debt prone African countries. 
 
There were arguments brought to the fore against the acceptability or tenability of fiscal 
union in a monetary union. The distributional consequences of fiscal policy is the main 
adverse factor. The central view of seminal contributions to the OCA theory which 
postulate that transfer made through a centralised system of taxes and budgetary 
transfer as the alternative to labour mobility failed to consider the redistribution effects 
of such fiscal system because of the simple assumption that one-direction transfer in one 
period would be offset by transfer in the other direction in the next period (Eichengreen, 
2014). There are the evidence of large on-going transfers associated with existing fiscal 
system demonstrating or reflecting important redistribution implications.14 Buttressing 
further Eichengreen, (2014) posited that in practice, it is not possible to detach the 
redistributive effect of a federal budget in an integrated fiscal federalism from its 
                                                          
13A member of a monetary union, on (becoming a member), according to the OCA theory loses fast and simple 
adjustment instruments and there would be compounded problems if such country is hit by asymmetric country 
specific shocks or shocks exhibiting differences in national institutional details like flexibility of labour. 
14Eichengreen (2014) demonstrated the evidence put forward by Bayoumi and Masson showing that “while Federal 
taxes and transfers have significant stabilisation effect on US region (they offset 31 cents of every US$1 decline in 
regional income), they also have permanent redistributional effects (of 22 cents on the dollar) from high to low 
income states and regions. In Canada, the stabilisation effect (17 cents) is smaller, but the redistributive effect (at 39 cents) is even larger.” 
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assurance effect, thus (from his own opinion) making fiscal union untenable, given these 
distributional consequences. 
4. Making the Case for Democratic Political Union  
If properly implemented, a political union may give assurance towards the sustainability 
of a monetary union. The workability of a separate budget in a monetary union appears 
sceptical given expected difficulties and the political challenge in bringing members of a 
monetary union together in line to accept the very huge financial burden of the funding 
of the central budget. This makes a case for a monetary union embedded in a political 
union. Hence, a monetary union should be embedded in a political union as De Grauwe 
(2014) stressed that for a monetary union to be complete and sustainable, sovereignty 
should be transferred from national institutions to a supranational institution, adding 
that this denotes moving to a political union. 
For instance, the European Monetary Union (EMU) failed to go the direction of all that 
were indicated by past history and experiences of successful monetary unifications 
(particularly, the US case) which all stressed the relevance of political union as essential 
prerequisite for monetary union to be effective. The 1970 Werner Report prompted the 
EMU to go the other way based on the conviction of Werner Report that the proposed 
monetary union and single currency "would act as a leaven for the development of 
political union, which in the long run, it cannot do without". The plan proposed by the 
Werner Report was the establishment of a currency union without a common budget and 
without a common central bank. This was based on the Report's conviction that a central 
budget and a common central bank could surface later on and that the proposed single currency and the monetary union would act as “a leaven for the development of political union, which in the long run it cannot do without”. The 1971 'snake in tunnel' was the 
initial step taken towards centralised monetary policy. Two powerful reports after these 
strongly advised the essence of a centralised budget and stronger political union as pre-
requisites for the workability and sustainability of a monetary union. Consequently, the 
Werner Plan thus believes a monetary union initiates movements towards a political 
union. The construction of a monetary union made by 1989 Delors Report was in terms of the continuation “of individual nations with differing economic, social, cultural and political characteristics” and the “existence and preservation of this plurality would 
require a degree of autonomy in economic decision-making to remain with the individual member countries.” The EMU will have to become a political union to survive, given the 
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lesson from historical analyses of monetary union over the past centuries (Gerrard 
Lyons).15 
Therefore, for the African monetary integration initiatives, if political union is to be 
sustainable, it is essential that it is established firmly so that it does not cause future 
political and economic problems in continent. In doing so, it is necessary to move fiscal 
and key regulatory powers to a central political institution. In the case of the EMU, it is 
unfortunately that there had been difficulties in complementing the monetary union with 
a political structure that is sufficient and adequate. In history, there had not been any 
historical precedents about building democracies at the supranational levels, even as 
there are democracies at national levels. These are important issues that should be given 
attention by African nations. Many of the African nations are weakly democratised, 
exhibiting low governance indicators. The complex decision to make is therefore about 
determining the form and dimension of political union to settle for. Nevertheless, various 
attempts to give an exact definition to 'political union' and explain its goals have failed.  
However, Dullien and Torreblanca (2012), expressed that there are three dimensions of 
political union that should be well-balanced in order to avoid disaster within a monetary 
union. These political union dimensions which may be considered in the case of the 
proposed African monetary union are highlighted in Table 1 below. Central decision 
makers at a monetary union level face enormous tasks and difficulties in make choices 
from the extremes in the three dimensions of political union. The extremes in the first 
dimension are limited economic federalism (at one end) and full economic federalism (at 
the other end). In the second dimension, the extreme options are enforcement of rules (at 
one end) and giving rooms for discretion (at the other end) while indirect legitimacy (at 
one end) and direct legitimacy ((at the other end) are the extremes in the third 
dimension. 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Source: http://www.euro-know.org/europages/articles/rmu.html. 
 Gerard Lyons, a British economist is currently Economic Adviser to the Mayor of London and  formerly Chief 
Economist and Group Head of Global Research at Standard Chartered. http://www.euro-
know.org/europages/articles/rmu.html 
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Table 1: Dimensions of Political Union 
 Options Features and Explanations 
1 Limited Economic 
Federation or Full 
Economic Federation 
*This is about making a choice between limited economic 
federation ('minimalist' vision) and full economic federation 
('great leap' vision). 
*Under the limited economic federation, the monetary union 
member states only transfer to the central levels, those 
powers that are strictly and specifically necessary to bring a 
particular crisis to an end and further prevent the break-up of 
the monetary union. There powers pertaining to fiscal policy 
supervision, regulation of the integrated financial market, the 
scope of banking union and common financial oversight of the 
common central bank. The aim of limited economic federation 
is just to stabilise the single currency. 
* The full economic federation entails the creation of full 
fiscal, banking, and economic unions and also the setting up of 
new, solid and centralised structure of governance. The basis 
of this is the theory of fiscal federalism which postulates that 
policy decisions that significantly affect constituent parts 
negatively or positively should be moved to the central level 
in order to ensure that some degree s of specific competences 
are present at the centre through the desired endogenous 
mechanism. 
2 Rules-based Federation or 
Discretion-based 
Federation 
* This is about making a choice between rules-based 
federation and discretion-based federation. 
*Rules-based federation gives little room for policy flexibility 
and innovation. With this, some binding rules are set at the 
centre so as to prevent member sovereigns from adopting 
some specific policies which are at the heart of central 
elements of sovereignty (for instance, powers to take 
decisions on budgetary matters). 
*Discretion-based federation affords abundant discretionary 
powers to take economic decisions as a well as sufficient 
economic policy tools. 
*For supporters of rules-based federation, rules are public 
goods that give benefits to all members as they guarantee 
sound finances as well as financial stability. 
*The proponents of discretion-based federation believe that 
there are complexities in realities that could not be simply 
catered for by rules and consequently, powers at the centre 
should be discretionary, just as those discretionary powers 
enjoyed at the national levels. 
3 Intergovernmentalism 
(Indirect Legitimacy 
Federation) or Federalism 
(Direct Legitimacy 
Federation) 
*This is about making a choice between 
intergovernmentalism and federalism. 
*Indirect legitimacy federation or intergovernmentalism is 
associated with the view that member countries possess the 
ultimate legitimacy and democracy and that if sovereignty is 
to be transferred through political union, this should require a 
parallel upgrading of member countries in the central 
decision making. 
*Direct legitimacy federation or federalism confers abundant 
legitimate powers and authority on supra institutions (like 
European Union (EU) in Europe or Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa) or a central 
parliamentary institution. 
Source: Author and Dullien and Torreblanca (2012). 
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These thus yield the two models of political union dimensions in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Models of Political Union Dimensions 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dimension 1 Limited Economic 
Federalism 
Full Economic Federalism 
Dimension 2 Rules-based Federalism Discretion-based Federalism 
Dimension 3 Indirect Legitimacy Direct legitimacy 
Source: Author and Dullien and Torreblanca (2012). 
 
Model 1 represents minimum departure from the existing position while Model 2 depicts 
a high degree of ambition. Conspicuously, Model 1 is rooted by limited economic 
federalism, rule-based federalism and indirect legitimacy just as Model 2 is about the 
establishment of full economic federation, sufficient powers for discretion to make 
policies and direct legitimate federalism. Analytical observation of the underlying notion 
of the extremes in Model 1 would lead to the conclusion that the application of the model 
would not yield a sustainable political union. Some of the reasons for the unsustainable 
posture of Model 1 is that rules involved may lack the adequate strength needed to attend 
to future economic needs and thus may compound and turn future economic 
predicaments into magnified economic crisis. Another reason is that at the various 
member countries' level, there may be political turmoil due to the absence of direct 
legitimacy; and this may further cause fresh crisis that may likely force the movements 
to Model 2 so as to benefit from the advantages of the components of this model.  
If the rule-based federation and direct legitimacy federalism are combined with an 
economic federalism may result into revolt by citizens at the national levels whenever 
they find out that those elected at the central lack real powers to affect policies and rules 
or lack powers to enact new rules and policies (Dullien and Torreblanca, 2012).  However, 
there could be some combinations of choices from the three dimensions.  
Extra caution should be made to avoid 'free picks and choices' because some of these 
combinations could cause further economic, financial and political crisis. Apart from the 
three dimensions of political union explained above in Table 1 and Table 2, there are 
three different established benchmarks of political integration as shown in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Dimensions of Political Union 
 Benchmarks Features and Explanations 
1 Functional political 
integration 
*This indicates the coming close together of various areas of 
government. It involves: 
- the harmonisation of many aspects of member country's 
national laws; 
- establishment of supra national laws and regulations; 
- binding budgetary commitments; 
- enhanced system of multilateral surveillance; 
- common supranational constitutional framework; 
- bringing absolute economic powers of the national 
governments to an end;  
- transfer of income redistribution, allocation role and 
stabilisation, employment role and promotion of growth to the 
supranational level; 
- harmonisation of legal and regulatory frameworks. 
2 Transfer of sovereignty 
over elements of national 
economic policy 
This entails: 
-centralisation of monetary and exchange rate policies; 
- relinquishing monetary policy to a common central body; 
- joint decision on the overall framework for the conduct of 
exchange rate policy; 
-sole responsibility for management and holding of foreign 
exchange reserves and the conduct of foreign exchange 
operations by a common central monetary authority; 
- establishment of annual stability programme of national 
government, incorporating budgetary objectives. 
3 Necessity for policy 
coordination 
This involves: 
- multilateral close-watch and regular exchange of ideas and 
opinions at supranational meetings, on policies and 
developments that are union-wide and country-specific;  
- regular deliberations and joint participation in the 
operations of main supranational institutions within the 
monetary union; 
- various ways of team-working on specific plans and 
programmes and collaborated rule-making.   
 Source: Author 
Generally, for a monetary union, the effects of political unification will manifest in two 
ways. Firstly, centralised budget that makes the alleviation of the plights derived from 
negative shock-countries possible and this consequently reduces the scope for potential 
liquidity crisis that may hit individual member countries within the currency area. 
Secondly, the degree of asymmetry would be reduced (De Grauwe, 2014). These two 
factors would cause political unification to increase the sustainability of monetary union, 
on the long run. If political union should increase the sustainability of a monetary union, 
it is critical that such political union is made sustainable.  
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Table 4: Implications of Political Integration for the Optimality of a Monetary Union 
 Through: How it works 
1 Possible centralisation of 
significant part of 
national budgets at the 
monetary union level 
*Organising system of automatic fiscal transfer that provides 
some insurance against asymmetric shock. 
*Therefore, whenever a union member is hit by a negative 
shock, the centralised budget automatically transfers fund from 
the 'boom' member country (experiencing good economic 
condition) to the 'doom'/'recession' member country 
(experiencing negative shock . 
*Consequently, the 'doom'/'recession' country perceives her 
membership of the monetary union to be less costly than where 
there is no fiscal transfer mechanism. 
*This reduces the scope for liquidity crisis hitting individual 
countries. 
2 Consolidating part of 
national government 
debts into jointly issued 
debt at monetary union  
*Political unification allows the entire monetary union to better 
withstand the movements of distrusts afflicting national 
government that by implications of the single currency, could 
not issue their own currency.  
*Political union reduces financial fragility of the monetary 
union. 
3 Removal of unilateral 
powers of the national 
government and 
parliaments to affect 
spending, taxes, social 
policies and wages 
within the monetary 
union 
*The unilateral decision to lower (or increase) taxes (as well as 
decision on wages and social policies) create asymmetric shock  
*Political unification thus reduces extent of possible the 
politically originated asymmetric shocks. 
*It further increases long term sustainability of the monetary 
union. 
Source: De Grauwe (2014) 
 
Apart from general applications, information in Table 4 above suggests (from the three 
channels) what African political integration implies for optimality of African monetary 
cooperation.  
 
Table 5: Summary of Suggested Elements of Genuine and Sustainable European Monetary Union 
 Main Elements Features Purposes 
 
 
1 
 
 
Integrated Financial 
Frame work – Banking 
Union 
*Single or centralised 
supervision spearheaded by the 
common central bank (ECB). 
*Single resolution mechanism. 
*Single deposit insurance 
scheme. 
*To brake the ‘doom loop’ 
between banks and sovereigns 
nations. 
*To counter the threat that ‘dealing with bank crisis would 
overwhelm the fiscal capacity of vulnerable member countries’.  
 
 
2 
Integrated Budget 
Framework – Fiscal 
Union 
*Central budget for the 
monetary union. 
*Debt mutualisation mechanism. 
*Fiscal transfer mechanism. 
*To ensure greater and better 
discipline in public finance within 
the monetary union. 
*To establish a wide range of 
fiscal policy instrument within 
the monetary union. 
To create capacity for the 
monetary union towards 
facilitating adjustments to 
economic shocks 
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3 
Integrated Economic 
Policy Framework 
*Coordination of economic 
policy. 
*Member states regarding their 
economic policies as a matter of 
common concern. 
*To promote sustainable growth, 
competitiveness and employment 
within the monetary union. 
*To improve the resilience of the 
economy of the entire monetary 
union to shocks. 
*To serve as a means of imposing 
economic decisions on member 
states under specific and well-
defined circumstances. 
 
4 
Democratic Legitimacy 
and Accountability for 
Decision Making – 
Democratic Political 
Union 
*Democratic control and 
accountability at the decision 
making level. 
*European parliament 
involvement in accountability at 
the union level, while the pivotal 
roles of national parliaments are 
maintained. 
*To enhance the domestic 
oversight of pooled economic 
policies. 
*To ensure effectiveness of the 
integrated financial budgetary 
end economic frameworks. 
Source: Author 
In summary, Table above 5 highlights the summary of the elements of genuine and 
sustainable EMU and the associated features and purposes as applicable to the future 
African monetary integration as exposed by the financial crisis within the Eurozone crisis: 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Evidences generated from the analyses of the formation of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) prompted many conclusions that there were major defects in its establishment as 
exposed by the Eurozone crisis. Some of these identified optimum currency area (OCA) 
related design flaws of the Eurozone are: (i) the absence of effective economic 
governance mechanism; (ii) the retention of banking supervision and resolution at 
national levels; (iii) the lack of financial back-stops and crisis resolution mechanisms at 
the union level; and (iv) defects in the design of the Eurozone's common central bank. 
From these, it is apparent that the Eurozone crisis has obviously revealed that banking 
union and integrated financial market, fiscal union and integrated fiscal framework and 
political union are all required in a monetary union, for completeness and sustainability. 
Unfortunately, these are issues not addressed by the OCA theory. From view-points in 
various debates on the sustainability and completeness of the EMU as well as various 
revealed faults in the design of Eurozone and the defects inherent in the original optimum 
currency area (OCA) theory and its application to monetary integration, this paper 
consequently discussed and highlighted banking union, fiscal union and political union as 
pathways to complete and sustainable monetary integration in Africa. 
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The paper established that for an African monetary union, a common banking 
supervision mechanism would guarantee impartial and strict supervisory oversight which contributes to the ‘destruction of the link between sovereigns and banks as well as 
reduce the probability of future systemic banking crisis within the monetary union. 
Furthermore, it was highlighted that a common resolution mechanism in an African 
monetary union would create a single authority that would be charged with the task of 
bank resolution within the monetary union. More appropriately, this mechanism should 
come up with a single resolution fund that should be provided by all banks in the 
monetary union and made available to these banks in distress.  A common deposit 
insurance scheme for the African monetary integration schemes was also considered as 
appropriate in serving as an essential assurance providing sufficient insurance of eligible 
deposits of all banking institutions in the integrated countries in Africa.  
This paper also stressed the relevance of a fiscal union embedded in an African monetary 
union as one that will smoothen shocks affecting only a constituent part of the African 
monetary union and provide a common fiscal cushion to meet idiosyncratic economic and 
financial shocks, towards strengthening confidence in the entire monetary union, 
removing or preventing spill over of problem that may be erupted by crisis and thus, 
reducing the cost of shock for all members of the proposed African Monetary Union. Also, 
such fiscal union would build effective risk-sharing arrangement for sovereign debts, 
while avoiding moral hazard problems and significant inter-country fiscal transfer, 
financing large common investment projects with public debts that are jointly issued, as 
much as possible and enhancing fiscal capacities through restriction of laxity in public 
spending by possible debt prone African countries.  
This paper further made a case for an African monetary union embedded in a political 
union because the workability of a separate budget in a monetary union appears sceptical 
given expected difficulties and the political challenge in bringing members of a monetary 
union together in line to accept the very huge financial burden of the funding of the 
central budget. This would involve transferring sovereignty from national institutions to 
a supranational institution, implying moving fiscal and key regulatory powers to a central 
political institution. It is considered necessary for the African monetary integration 
initiatives to always note that if political union is to be sustainable, it is essential that it is 
established firmly so that it does not cause future political and economic problems in 
continent. As established in literature, three dimensions of political union that should be 
19 | P a g e  
 
well-balanced in order to avoid disaster within a monetary union were consequently 
highlighted by this paper as: (i) Limited Economic Federation or Full Economic 
Federation, (ii) Rules-based Federation or Discretion-based Federation and (iii) 
Intergovernmentalism (Indirect Legitimacy Federation) or Federalism (Direct 
Legitimacy Federation). These three dimensions were transformed into two models of 
political union for the proposed African monetary integration. 
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